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This paper tests for the impact of survivorship bias by building on the work of 
Cubbin, Eidne, Firer and Gilbert (2006), and Bailey and Gilbert (2007). The 
former paper confirmed the existence of mean reversion on the JSE Securities 
Exchange, because portfolios of shares with high Price to Earnings (P/E) ratios 
(being those which had tended to outperform recently) underperformed 
significantly over five years against portfolios of shares with low P/E ratios. The 
latter paper developed the economic validity of this conclusion by applying 
liquidity constraints to portfolio formation. This tended to slightly dampen the 
observed effects, but confirmed the significant presence of mean reversion. In 
both cases, extensive efforts were made to include all delisted shares in the study 
to avoid the effects of survivorship bias. This paper updates both studies by 
extending the period for a further 21 months, and then quantifies the impact of 
survivorship bias by comparing the results against those of an equivalent study 
based on a data set of currently listed shares only. The results of our study 
confirm  that the effects of survivorship bias are present and material. While 
patterns of mean reversion are detected on both data sets, the returns earned on 
portfolios selected from currently listed shares are significantly higher than the 
corresponding returns on portfolios selected from all shares. Survivorship bias is 
therefore confirmed to be a significant issue in such studies, which researchers 
should be careful to avoid; although it does not necessarily affect the conclusion 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most common challenges facing financial researchers in emerging 
markets is the lack of a clean and comprehensive data set of price and accounting 
data for listed firms. There may be some historical data available for currently 
listed companies – but historical data availability for delisted shares is always an 
issue.  
 
It is well established in financial research that ignoring delisted companies when 
conducting historical research leads to the presence of survivorship bias. As Bain 
(1972: 105) asserts, when commenting on a paper by Wagner and Lau (1971): 
"the use of ex-post sampling will invariably produce an upward bias in the 
measurement of returns on risky securities". This bias results from the use of a 
data set that consists of the survivors over a period, not the full set of companies 
that were listed over this period. As the characteristics of the survivors are likely 
to differ systematically from those who have delisted, the results of such a study 
will be biased. Given that collecting data for delisted companies is a time-
consuming and expensive process, obvious questions are does it really matter, 
and should researchers attempt to correct for this problem?  
 
A review of the international evidence suggests that survivorship bias does 
matter. However, no attempt to answer this question has been made for South 
Africa. This paper attempts to address this gap by building on the empirical work 
reported in Cubbin, Eidne, Firer and Gilbert (2006), and Bailey and Gilbert 
(2007).  
 
The former paper confirmed the existence of mean reversion on the JSE 
Securities Exchange, because portfolios of shares with high P/E ratios (being 
those which had tended to outperform recently) underperformed significantly 
over five years against portfolios of shares with low P/E ratios. The latter paper 
developed the economic validity of this conclusion by applying liquidity 
constraints to portfolio formation. This tended to slightly dampen the observed 
effects, but confirmed the significant presence of mean reversion.  
 
In both cases, extensive efforts were made to include all delisted shares in the 
study to avoid survivorship bias. This paper updates both studies by extending 
the period for a further 21 months, and then quantifies the impact of survivorship 
bias by comparing the results against those of an equivalent study based on a 
data set of currently listed shares only. 
 
The results of our study confirm that the effects of survivorship bias are present 
and material. While patterns of mean reversion are detected on both data sets, 
the returns earned on portfolios selected from currently listed shares are 
significantly higher than the corresponding returns on portfolios selected from all 
shares. Survivorship bias is therefore confirmed to be a significant issue in such 
studies, which researchers should be careful to avoid; although it does not affect 
the conclusion of the patterns of mean reversion revealed in the earlier studies.  
   4 
Section two of this paper will review the evidence for the importance of 
survivorship bias in empirical studies. Section three will outline the methodology 
used in this study and section four will present the results. Section five concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The presence and possible effects of survivorship bias has concerned researchers 
in this field, particularly in the United States (US). The primary data sources used 
in the US for finance-related research are the COMPUSTAT data base (for 
accounting data) and the data prepared by the University of Chicago's Centre for 
Research into Securities Prices (CRSP) (for price data). While the CRSP data set 
does not suffer from significant survivorship bias issues, the way the COMPUSTAT 
database is created does lead to this problem
2
                                            
2 Another problem with the COMPUSTAT database is the presence of the 'look ahead' bias. 
This occurs when data are recorded as being available to investors at a particular time, when 
it actually only becomes available at a later stage. For example, the annual financial 
statements (or announcement of the earnings) for a company may only be made public 
several months after its year end. However, in the COMPUSTAT database, these earnings 
would have been recorded as applying to the whole financial year, i.e., they were reported 
immediately. 
. Firstly, the accounting data for 
companies that are delisted are deleted from the database. Secondly, new 
companies added to the dataset are included with a full history, which means that 
companies that do not succeed are not included.  
 
Researchers became aware of the presence and potential effects of survivorship 
bias in the early 1970s when looking at the question of using accounting data in 
explaining the cross-section of share returns. Initial tests were limited and 
focused on establishing whether the conclusions of previous studies were robust 
(Ball and Watts, 1979; Salamon and Smith, 1977). The first comprehensive 
examination of, and test for, the effects of this bias only happened later 
(McElreath and Wiggins, 1984; Banz and Breen, 1986, Davis 1994, 1996). The 
question of the impact of survivorship bias was also discussed in the context of 
establishing the persistence of portfolio manager returns (Grindblatt and Titman, 
1989; Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross, 1992; Carpenter and Lynch, 
1999).  
 
Ball and Watts (1979) refer to a study they completed in 1972 where they 
critically evaluated the time series properties of Earnings Per Share (EPS) for 
listed companies. In their initial study, they recognised the potential for the 
existence of survivorship bias given the problems in the way COMPUSTAT data 
was created, but did not know how to correct for it. In their later, paper they 
present data that suggests that survivorship bias would not have had a significant 
impact on the conclusions of their earlier research. They reached this conclusion 
by randomly selecting 25 shares that were in existence in 1916 and 25 shares 
that were in existence in 1966. They compared the characteristics of the EPS time 
series for these shares with 25 shares which had been in existence from 1916 to 
1966. They found no significant difference in the results for these two samples. 
   5 
McElreath and Wiggins (1984) explore more comprehensively the potential impact 
of survivorship bias in the COMPUSTAT data set. They reviewed the reasons for 
the delisting of the 330 firms that had left the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
in the period 1970 to 1979 (approximately 1800 shares were listed on the NYSE 
at the end of the 1970s). They concluded that the likely size of the bias due to 
survivorship was not primarily due to the fact that 55% of these delisting were 
due to mergers. Also, bankruptcy and liquidations only accounted for 6% of the 
delisted firms. No further quantitative comparative analyses between this group 
of firms and those still listed was presented.  
 
Banz and Breen (1986) present the first comprehensive, direct test of the size 
and impact of survivorship bias on the COMPUSTAT database. In a very similar 
vein to  this paper, they compare the nature of the properties of two separate 
populations of firms – a complete and a partially complete (currently listed only) 
COMPUSTAT list of firms. For the period 1974 to 1981 they collected accounting 
data on a monthly basis for all listed firms on the NYSE and the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX). They then compare the differences in return of similar equally 
weighted portfolios created from this list and the COMPUSTAT dataset. The 
portfolios were created on the basis of size (quintiles), and the firms with positive 
earnings then were ranked in terms of Earnings Yield (Earnings/Price)
3
Davis (1996) tests for the effects of survivorship bias on the results of his earlier 
study (Davis, 1994) that used COMPUSTAT data in part. He identifies, and then 
directly compares, the nature of the firms listed on the NYSE and the AMEX that 
were excluded from the COMPUSTAT data set to those in the set. He finds that 
. They use 
a Seemingly Unrelated Regression approach to test for significant differences in 
the returns of all 30 portfolios. The differences in returns were found to be 
significant at the 1% level for all portfolios whether the raw or risk-adjusted 
portfolio returns were compared.  
 
They point out that this difference in returns is actually the combined effects of 
the survivorship and "look ahead" biases. To isolate the effects of the differences 
due to survivorship bias, they create a subset of firms that are included in the 
partial COMPUSTAT data series from their complete list. They then recreate the 
portfolios as explained above using their complete list and this subset of their 
complete list. In other words, the effects of the differences in the portfolio returns 
could only be due to survivorship bias. Again, the differences in returns are 
statistically significant. It is interesting to note, however, that the returns from 
the portfolios created from the complete list were systematically greater than 
those created from the smaller list. This is the opposite result to the expected 
effect as summarised by Bain (1972) above. 
 
Banz and Breen (1986) also evaluate the effects of the survivorship bias on the 
results of studies investigating the presence of size and P/E effects on portfolio 
returns. They find that using the complete data series (i.e., corrected for the 
missing firms) leads to the rejection of earlier claims of a P/E effect on returns 
when size is controlled for. They conclude that survivorship bias does seem to 
matter. 
 
                                            
3 The firms with negative earnings were allocated to a sixth portfolio for each size quintile.   6 
the nature of the excluded firms is systematically different in terms of relative 
size (the excluded firms are smaller) and monthly returns (the excluded firms 
have lower returns). While the inclusion of the shares listed in the Moody's 
database (but not in the COMPUSTAT database) did not change the conclusions of 
his previous study, it did lead to non-trivial difference in the regression results, 
both in terms of economic and statistical significance.  
 
Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) confirm the importance of the effects of 
survivorship. They firstly establish that the returns to the share excluded from the 
COMPUSTAT database (but on the CRSP data series) are on average 9 to 10 
percentage points lower than the shares included in the database. This 
emphasises the systematic difference of the nature of the excluded shares. They 
also show that the significant Book to Market Value (B/M) result of Fama and 
French (1992) can, in part, be explained by the survivorship bias in the data set 
they used
4
3. Research Methodology 
. 
 
When evaluating the persistence of portfolio manager’s outperformance, 
Grindblatt and Titman (1989) review the relative performance of US portfolio 
managers for the period 1974 to 1984. They test for the potential size of 
survivorship bias by comparing the results of the entire universe of 274 funds 
with the sample of 157 surviving funds. They find that the effects are small, 
between 0.1% and 0.4% of gross returns per year, and statistically insignificant. 
 
Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) conclude that survivorship bias will 
definitely have an effect on the results, but the size of this effect is an empirical 
question. Carpenter and Lynch (1999) indicate that 0.14% to 0.27% of gross 
management outperformance (alpha) returns can be attributed to survivorship 
bias. 
 
Our study adds to this literature in two ways: firstly by testing for the effects of 
survivorship bias in a mean reversion context; and secondly, by using data for 
South Africa for the first time.  
 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) first examined the question of the existence of 
mean reversion in returns for the US. They identified ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ portfolios 
based on past abnormal returns. They then tracked the relative performance of 
these portfolios. The research of Cubbins, Eidne, Firer and Gilbert (2006) was the 
first study to comprehensively establish the presence of mean reversion of share 
returns in South Africa. Their approach differed from that of De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985). Their ‘winners’ represented firms with high P/E ratios and their ‘losers’ 
represented firms with low P/E ratios. 
 
                                            
4 The other reason offered for their finding that the B/M result of Fama and French (1992) was 
not valid was that their dataset was significantly longer (1927 to 1990) than that used by 
Fama and French (1941 to 1990). In other words, they believe that Fama and French’s results 
were period specific.      7 
Bailey and Gilbert (2007) extended the results of Cubbins et al  (2006) by 
applying liquidity caps to ‘High P/E’ and ‘Low P/E’ portfolios in an attempt to 
evaluate the economic reality of the abnormal returns seemingly offered by the 
presence of mean reversion. They tested for effects of liquidity constraints on the 
presence of mean reversion in multiple portfolios by applying liquidity caps. 
Depending on the value of a portfolio, a share would only be considered for 
inclusion if its average monthly traded volume was sufficiently large. They 
concluded that, although dampened, mean reversion persists after application of 
liquidity constraints.  
 
This paper builds on this work, by testing for the presence and effects of 
survivorship bias by applying the Bailey and Gilbert methodology to two separate 
groups of firms: the complete list of firms and the list of firms that are currently 
listed on the JSE Securities Exchange. 
 
We replicated the methodology used by Gilbert and Bailey (2007) using historic 
share data collected from I-Net Bridge. The key advances are: firstly, we 
extended the period under consideration by 21 months; and secondly, we 
conducted the analysis on two separate groups of shares: the currently listed 
shares and the complete  list of shares (i.e., including the delisted shares). By 
comparing the results of the two groups of shares, we can ascertain the effects of 
the lack of the delisted shares on the results of this study. 
 
Historical data for shares traded on the JSE at each month end was obtained from 
I-Net Bridge. Month end price, Earnings Yield (from which P/E ratio was derived) 
and dividend yield data were collected for all shares listed on the All Share Index 
(ALSI) for the JSE for the period 31 October 1984 to 31 September 2007 – a 23 
year period
5




                                            
5 We excluded preference shares (‘P’ series) from the analysis, because they have a different 
dividend risk profile. 
6 We have used the old code list from I-net Bridge to identify the delisted shares. While this is 
the most complete and accurate list of 'dead' shares that we were able to obtain, the jumps in 
the number of firms covered by our analysis (see Figure 1) suggest that we still do not have a 
comprehensive list. 
 and all the data for these 
shares was included in the dataset for this period. In total, 1631  shares were 
included in the analysis, of which 841 had either been delisted or were removed 
due to some other type of corporate action.  
 
The data presented in Figure 1 highlights the existence and size of the difference 
in the two groups of shares. The dark shaded area represents the shares that are 
currently listed (the ‘current’ list) and the light shaded area indicates all the 
shares that were listed (the ‘complete’ list). The area between the two parts 
represents the shares that would have been excluded from the analysis if only the 
currently listed shares were included in the analysis. The relative variation of the 
two lists ranged from 0% (in the final month –  by definition) to 80% (in late 
1992).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE   8 
 
While I-Net Bridge was the most complete and accurate data source that we were 
able to use, we still encountered significant data completeness and quality issues. 
The presence of the discontinuous jumps in the number of total shares in 
September 1991, November 1992 and September 1997 in Figure 1 suggest that 
the list of 'dead' shares from I-Net Bridge  is still not completely accurate. 
Moreover, the P/E Ratio data was found to be unreliable so we used the inverse of 
Earnings Yield (EY) ratio that had been recorded more extensively and more 
accurately in the dataset. We also encountered obvious errors in share price and 
dividend yield data. Where found, these observations were deleted. The reasons 
for these errors have not been fully resolved and one of the project's conclusions 
is that we need to consolidate and clean this historical database through 
comparisons with other sources (e.g., McGregors BFA Net, Datastream or 
Reuters). 
 
Following Bailey and Gilbert (2007), we adjusted for liquidity by applying a 
liquidity cap. We assumed an investor starts with a specific amount of money to 
be invested in the portfolio. For the sake of illustration, assume this is R1 billion. 
As every portfolio is made up of 35 equally weighted shares, the investment 
required in each share is equal to the value of the portfolio (R1 billion) divided by 
the number of shares in the  portfolio (35). Approximately R28.5m is thus 
invested in each share. It is at this point that the liquidity cap comes into 
consideration. For the share to be considered for inclusion in the portfolio, 50% of 
the average monthly value of shares traded must  exceed this threshold of 
R28.5m, suggesting that it would be possible for the portfolio manager to unwind 
a position in that share within a reasonable time period. This is calculated by 
taking the average volume of shares (which is based on the previous 12 months’ 
volume traded) multiplied by the current share price and then dividing by two. If, 
for example, the average number of shares traded each month is 500 000 and 
the current share price is R10 then the liquidity cap for this share is 500 000 × 
R10 × 50% = R2.5 million. 
 
In this example, the share would be filtered out due to its lack of liquidity for an 
investor of this size (R28.5m investment > R5,5m liquidity cap). However, if the 
investor had a portfolio of R10m, then this share would be considered available 
for investment (R10m/35 = R0,285m holding per share which is less than the 
R2,5m liquidity cap).  
 
Using the approach outlined above, a liquidity constraint can be derived from 
portfolio size, share price and average volume traded. As explained above, the 
impact of the liquidity cap is dependent on the size of the portfolio. Seven 
different portfolio sizes were evaluated: R0 (i.e., no liquidity constraint), R100 
000, R1 million, R10 million, R100 million, R1 billion, and R10 billion.  
 
These portfolio sizes reflect nominal values as at the end of the portfolio 
formation period of the study (September 2002). To ensure that portfolio sizes 
were comparable in real terms, the nominal size of portfolios was discounted by 
the monthly inflation rate for portfolios formed prior to September, 2002. The 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) for South Africa for the entire period of the study was   9 
downloaded from International Financial Statistics website
7
The shares that met this liquidity requirement were then ranked by their P/E 
ratios at the portfolio formation date and portfolios consisting of the top 35 (high 
P/E) and bottom 35 (low P/E) shares were constructed
 which is run by the 
International Monetary Fund.  
 
The liquidity cap was calculated using this methodology for all shares for a given 
portfolio size. Those shares which did not meet the liquidity cap were excluded 
from the rest of the portfolio construction process. 
 
8
One significant problem that we encountered with the implementation of this 
approach was the very high dividend yields associated with shares whose prices 
fell rapidly and approached zero. As the portfolios are equally weighted, the 
portfolios returns are the average of the individual component shares' returns. 
Thus if uncorrected, these outliers led to some portfolios having extremely high 
returns. To correct for this, we made all DY greater than 150% equal to zero. This 
minimised the effects of the real outliers on the portfolio returns
. These shares were 
weighted equally and the excess monthly returns relative to the ALSI index 
returns were then calculated for 5 years (60 months) from the portfolio formation 
date. The start date was then incremented one month forward and the process 
repeated. Applying this process over the entire period allowed for the creation of 
5,184 portfolios and 311,040 monthly returns. 
 
The monthly returns for each high P/E and low P/E portfolio were then combined 
and averaged to give the final average relative returns for each category. What 
this means is that the returns for month one of all the high P/E portfolios were 
combined to give the average high P/E portfolio return for month one. The same 
exercise was conducted for the low P/E portfolios to give the average returns for 
each month for these portfolios.  
 
Following the approach adopted by Cubbins, Eidne, Firer and Gilbert (2005) and 
Gilbert and Bailey (2007), our monthly portfolio returns are calculated as the sum 
of the capital gain (change in price/starting price) and dividend yields (DY) (with 
the latter converted to an equivalent monthly rate of  return). This was done 
because DY was recorded on a monthly basis, but it is obviously a proxy as the 
dividends are not received on an equal monthly basis over the 12 months of the 
year. Due to lack of data on the timing of the dividend payments, this is the next 
best solution.  
 
9
                                            
7 http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/ 
8 There were some months when there were less than 70 shares in the overall portfolio 
(especially when liquidity constraints were introduced). The high P/E and low P/E portfolios 
were formed in this case by taking the list of shares available (ranked by P/E) and dividing the 
shares into two equally sized groups. 
 reported in this 
analysis.  
9 We recognise that the use of 150% as the cutoff value is an arbitrary decision. We arrived at 
this number by considering the tradeoff between the effects of the cutoff level on the number 
of shares affected and the reality of the portfolio earning dividend yields of such high values. 
At levels below this value, we found that a relatively large proportion of shares were affected.   10 
4. Results 
 
The above analysis was conducted for six different portfolio sizes. For reasons of 
brevity we shall report the results for all shares (i.e., no liquidity cap) and, where 
relevant, highlight the differences in the results for the other five portfolio sizes. 
 
The pattern of average portfolio returns for the high and low P/E portfolios drawn 
from the complete and currently listed groups of shares is reported in Figure 2. 
These returns are the arithmetic average of portfolio returns relative to the ALSI 
return in the relevant month post portfolio formation.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Three important observations can be drawn from the data presented in this 
figure. Firstly, the outperformance of the low P/E shares relative to the high P/E 
shares holds for both groups of portfolios. Secondly, the pattern of the returns of 
the portfolios drawn from currently listed shares systematically differs from those 
drawn from the complete list of shares. Finally, the returns of the portfolios drawn 
from the currently listed shares only seem to systematically exceed the returns of 
the portfolios drawn from the complete set of shares. 
 
The first observation suggests that mean reversion is present for portfolios drawn 
from both groups of shares. The second and third observations indicate that 
survivorship bias is present in this study. These conclusions are examined in more 
detail below. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The geometric excess mean returns (annualised) for each group of portfolios are 
summarised in Table 1. This represents the average annual portfolio return in 
excess of the equivalent ALSI return for the same period. The same geometric 
means for all five liquidity caps are presented in Figure 3. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Looking at the data in Table 1, we can see that the mean excess returns for high 
P/E portfolios are significantly lower than the equivalent returns for the low P/E 
portfolios for both groups
10
                                                                                                                             
Anything above this number would lead to an unrealistically large upward bias in the 
measured return for the portfolio containing such a share. 
10 It can be argued that the data for the current portfolios provides only partial support for the 
presence of mean reversion conclusion. While the excess returns of the low P/E portfolios are 
consistently higher than the equivalent high P/E portfolios, the fact that the geometric mean 
return of the high P/E portfolios is positive indicates that they still outperform, rather than 
revert to the mean. 
. While not reported, here similar results holds for the 
differences in mean returns for the portfolios for all five liquidity caps considered. 
This strongly supports the conclusion that mean reversion is present in shares 
which are, or have been, listed on the JSE Securities Exchange.  
   11 
The dampening effect of liquidity caps on the size of the mean reversion effect 
reported in Bailey and Gilbert (2007) is also confirmed here. As is illustrated in 
Figure 3, there is a strong negative relationship between the geometric mean 
return for all the portfolios and the liquidity cap level, indicating that liquidity 
constraints do, as expected, limit portfolio managers’ attempts to outperform the 
market.  
 
The mean reversion result can also be clearly seen if the differences in excess 
returns between low and high P/E portfolio shares are plotted for the two groups 
of shares (Figure 4). For the complete list of shares, the average monthly excess 
return for the low P/E portfolio exceeds that of the high P/E portfolio for 55 out of 
the 60 months considered. For currently listed shares, the same result holds for 
all 60 months. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The robustness of the mean reversion result is further supported by the lack of 
any significant statistical difference in the pattern of outperformance of low P/E 
portfolios relative to high P/E portfolios illustrated in Figure 4. The differences are 
remarkably consistent – no matter what shares the portfolios are drawn from
11
                                            
11 Note that no attempt was made to adjust these results for the risks of the portfolios. It is 
possible (though we believe unlikely) that Betas could explain this effect. Zarowin (1989, 
1990), for example, finds that risk adjustments of this sort do explain the presence of mean 
reversion in share returns in the United States as identified by De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 
1987). However, these results have been questioned (Albert and Henderson, 1995; Gropp 
2004). This is an obvious area for further study, however. 
.  
 
The existence of survivorship bias can be seen more clearly if we plot the 
differences between the mean portfolio returns for high P/E portfolios drawn from 
the two sets of shares, and the same for low P/E portfolios. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.  
 
If there are systematic differences in the firms delisted as compared to those 
currently listed, then there should be a consistent difference in the returns to high 
(and low) P/E portfolios drawn from the two groups. In particular, we would 
expect there to be a positive difference between the portfolios drawn from the 
currently listed shares and those drawn from the complete list.  
 
This is almost exactly what we find illustrated in Figure 5. The difference between 
the returns for the current portfolios is positive for 50 months out of 60 for the 
high P/E portfolios and 43 months for the low P/E portfolios.  
 
The geometric averages of the differences in mean returns are summarised in 
Table 2. This represents the difference in high (and low) P/E portfolios for the 
current and complete lists of shares.  
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
   12 
The data presented in Table 2 shows that the positive differences in the portfolio 
returns for high (and low) P/E portfolios are significantly different from zero. 
While not reported here, these results hold true for all liquidity adjusted portfolios 
considered (the maximum p value is 0.0008 which is reported in Table 2). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The differences in the geometric average excess returns generated by the high 
and low P/E portfolios drawn from the two lists are reported in Figure 6 for the 
five different liquidity caps. This shows that the positive difference between the 
two is not affected by the changes in liquidity.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
  
This data indicates that survivorship bias is clearly present in the returns of the 




The data and analysis presented in this paper leads to a clear conclusion 
regarding the presence of survivorship bias, but implications for researchers are 
nuanced.  
 
On the one hand, the presence, and importance, of survivor bias is clearly 
demonstrated in the difference of returns between the complete and listed groups 
of firms. The mean levels of returns from the currently listed portfolios (both high 
P/E and low P/E) are significantly higher than those generated from the portfolios 
of the complete data set. This is exactly the sort of bias that would be expected if 
the characteristics of the delisted firms are systematically different from those 
that are listed at each point in time. This highlights the need for researchers to 
take the survivorship bias problem seriously – you will get incorrect answers if 
you do not. 
 
However, the results of this study do not challenge the conclusions of Cubbins et 
al (2006), and Bailey and Gilbert (2007) that mean reversion of share returns 
exists on the JSE. In other words, in this case, the right overall conclusion would 
have been reached even if a non survivorship bias corrected data set had been 
used. This suggests that mean reversion of returns is a robust phenomenon as it 
applies to both groups of shares that we examined. Given that there is no reason 
why mean reversion should not apply to all shares equally, this is a reassuring 
result. 
 
The conclusions are subject to the following caveats. Firstly, we are not convinced 
that we have a complete data set going back in time. As illustrated in Figure 1, 
there are clear jumps in the number of firms covered by the data provider. This 
strongly suggests that the data source we used is still not complete and thus free 
from survivorship bias. Secondly, in the process of creating the portfolios for this 
analysis, we noticed anomalies in the data which raises questions regarding the   13 
quality of the entire data set. This suggests the need for a data cleaning exercise 
on this data set. Thirdly, when calculating portfolio returns, we have treated 
delisted shares as delivering a zero return in the month following their delisting. 
This is correct if the company is in the process of being liquidated. However, this 
is obviously not correct if companies are delisted for other reasons and investors 
receive the value of their shares
12
                                            
12 This is equivalent to assuming that the return on the delisted share is -100%. This would 
overstate the loss (and understate the return) if some value is received for the share on its 
delisting. To test for the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we re-ran the analysis 
assuming a -50% return to the shares in the month following their delisting. There was not 
material change to our results. 
. Finally, we have not made any risk 
adjustments when comparing portfolio returns. There is some literature (Zarowin, 
1989, 1990; Clare and Thomas, 1995) that suggests that this may well affect the 
conclusions regarding the presence of mean reversion of returns. This offers an 
interesting opportunity to extend this work. 
 
In conclusion, our analysis shows that any research that excludes delisted shares 
is likely to be subject to survivorship bias. This may not materially affect the 
outcomes of the studies (as in this case), but our work suggests that including 
data for delisted shares is likely to have a significant effect on the results 
reached. Researchers should be aware of this and attempt to include such data in 
any empirical analysis of this sort.   14 
Reference 
 
Albert, RL and GV Henderson, 1995. Firm size, overreaction and return reversals. 
Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 34(4): 60-80. 
  
Bailey, G and E Gilbert. 2007. The impact of liquidity on mean reversion of share 
returns of the JSE. Investment Analysts Journal, 66: 1-11. 
 
Bain, JS. 1972. Letters to the Editor. Financial Analysts Journal, November/ 
December:  104-106. 
 
Ball R and R Watts. 1979. Some additional evidence on survival biases. Journal of 
Finance, 34: 197-206. 
 
Banz, RW and WJ Breen. 1986. Sample-dependent results using accounting and 
market data: some evidence. The Journal of Finance, 41(4): 779-793. 
 
Brown, SJ, W. Goetzman, RG Ibbotson and SA Ross, 1992. Survivorship bias in 
performance studies. Review of Financial Studies, 5(4): 553-580. 
 
Carpenter, JN and  AW Lynch, 1999. Survivorship bias and attrition effects in 
measures of performance persistence, Journal of Financial Economics, 54(3): 
337-374. 
 
Chan LKC, N Jegadeesh and J Lakonishok. 1995. Evaluating the performance of 
value versus glamour stocks - the impact of selection bias. Journal of Financial 
Economics, (38)3: 269-296. 
 
Cubbins E, M Eidne, C Firer, and E Gilbert. 2006. Mean reversion on the JSE 
Securities Exchange. Investment Analysts Journal, 63: 1-17. 
 
Clare, A. and S Thomas. 1995. The overreaction hypothesis and the UK 
stockmarket. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 22(7): 961-973. 
 
Davis, JL. 1994. The cross-section of realized stock returns: the pre-COMPUSTAT 
evidence. Journal Of Finance, 49(5): 1579-1593. 
 
Davis, JL. 1996. The cross-section of stock returns and survivorship bias: 
evidence from delisted stocks. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 
36(3): 365-375. 
 
De Bondt WFM and RH Thaler 1985. Does the Stock Market Overreact? Journal of 
Finance, 40(3): 793-806. 
 
De Bondt WFM and RH Thaler. 1987. Further Evidence On Investor Overreaction 
and Stock Market Seasonality. Journal of Finance, 42(3): 557-582. 
 
Fama, E and K French, 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns Journal 
of Finance, 47(2): 427-465.   15 
 
Grindblatt, M and S. Titman, 1989. Mutual Fund Performance: An Analysis of 
Quarterly Portfolio Holdings, Journal of Business, 62(3): 313-416. 
 
Gropp J 2004. Mean reversion of industry stock returns in the U.S., 1926–1998. 
Journal of Empirical Finance, 11(4): 537-551.  
 
Kothari, SP, Shanken, J and RG Sloan, 1995. Another look at the cross-section of 
expected stock returns, Journal of Finance, 50(1): 185-224. 
 
McElreath RB and CD Wiggins. 1984.  Using the COMPUSTAT tapes in financial 
research: problems and solutions. Financial Analysts Journal, January-February: 
71-76. 
 
Salamon GL and ED Smith. 1977. Additional evidence on the time series 
properties of reported earnings per share: comment. Journal of Finance, 32(5): 
1795-1801.  
 
Wagner WH and SC Lau. 1971. The Effects of Diversification on Risk. Financial 
Analysts Journal, November/December: 48-53. 
 
Zarowin P. 1989. Does the Stock Market Overreact to Corporate Earnings 
Information? Journal of Finance, 44(5): 1385-1399. 
 
Zarowin P. 1990. Size, Seasonality, and Stock Market Overreaction. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(1): 113-125. 
   16 
Table 1: Geometric average excess returns for high and low P/E portfolios (annualised) 
– no liquidity cap 
 
Portfolio  Geometric Mean Return 
p-values (paired t-test 
for difference in means) 
High P/E (Complete)  -1.05% 
0.0000 
Low P/E (Complete)  7.08% 
High P/E (Current)  2.32% 
0.0000 





Table 2: Geometric average difference in returns for high and low P/E portfolios 
 
Portfolios compared 
(Current – complete) 
Difference  
in geometric  
means  
p-values (one tailed 
paired t-test for 
difference from zero) 
High P/E portfolios  3.39%  0.0000 
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Figure 2: Returns for high and low P/E portfolios (relative to the ALSI) drawn from 
currently listed and complete populations – no liquidity cap 
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Figure 3: Impact of liquidity caps on the geometric mean excess returns of high and 
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Figure 4: Difference between low P/E and high P/E portfolio excess returns – no 
liquidity cap 
 









































Figure 5: Differences in mean portfolio returns (Current - Complete) for high and low 
P/E portfolios 
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